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recap
‘somebody team reasons if she works out the best possible feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in it.’
(Bacharach, 2006, p. 121)
‘The key difference between [individual and shared intentions]
is not a property of the intentions themselves,
but of the modes of reasoning by which they are formed.
Thus, an analysis which starts with the intention
has already missed
what is distinctively collective about it’
(Gold & Sugden, 2007)
two accounts involving team reasoning
Gold & Sugden, 2007
Pacherie, 2013
Pacherie’s ‘shared intention lite’
[Not] ‘all intentional joint actions require the sophistication in ascribing propositional attitudes that Bratman’s account appears to demand.
[I construct] ‘a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, less cognitively demanding than what the analyses proposed by leading philosophical accounts suggest and constituting a plausible basis from which more sophisticated forms of shared intentions can [...] emerge’
(Pacherie, 2013, p. 2)
importance: not aiming to tell the whole story
‘philosophers who appeal to shared intentions are trying to capture a stronger notion of intentional joint action.
For a joint activity to be a joint intentional action in this strong sense, the individuals who engage in this activity must think of its goal
not just as bringing about outcome O, but
as bringing about outcome O together.’
(Pacherie, 2013, p. 5)
‘Two persons P1 and P2 share an intention to A, if:
(i) each has a self-conception as a member of the team T, consisting of P1 and P2 (collective self-framing);
(i’) each believes (i) (group identification expectation);
(ii) each reasons that A is the best choice of action for the team (team reasoning from a group viewpoint); and
(iii) each therefore intends to do his part of A (team reasoning from an individual viewpoint).’
(Pacherie, 2013)
see also Gold & Sugden (2007); Pacherie (2011)
Does Pacherie’s view succeed where the Simple Theory failed?
The Simple Theory
Two or more agents perform an intentional joint action
exactly when there is an act-type, φ, such that
each agent intends that
they, these agents, φ together
and their intentions are appropriately related to their actions.
‘Two persons P1 and P2 share an intention to A, if:
(i) each has a self-conception as a member of the team T, consisting of P1 and P2 (collective self-framing);
(i’) each believes (i) (group identification expectation);
(ii) each reasons that A is the best choice of action for the team (team reasoning from a group viewpoint); and
(iii) each therefore intends to do his part of A (team reasoning from an individual viewpoint).’
1. What is team reasoning? ✓
2. How might team reasoning be used in constructing a theory of shared agency? ✓
background: aggregate agents ✓
What distinguishes joint action from parallel but merely individual action?
Joint action involves shared intention.
What is shared intention?
Bratman’s planning theory
vs
Pacherie’s team reasoning theory
Which, if either, is correct?