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Motor Representation and The Problem of Action

‘Now what is an action? Not one thing, but a series of two things: the state of mind called a volition, followed by an effect. The volition or intention to produce the effect, is one thing; the effect produced in consequence of the intention, is another thing; the two together constitute the action.’

Mill, System of Logic (1.3.6) quoted in Hyman (2015, p. 218)

essay questions related to todays lecture

How, if at all, should a philosophical theory of action incorporate scientific discoveries about the control of action?

Could some motor representations be intentions?

Which psychological structures enable agents to coordinate their plans? What if anything do these mechanisms reveal about how acting together differs from acting in parallel but merely individually?

How, if at all, should a philosophical theory of acting together incorporate scientific discoveries about the interpersonal coordination of action?

What distinguishes your actions from things that merely happen to you? (‘The Problem of Action’)

It seems reasonable to expect that any framework that supports theorising about action in the behavioural and social sciences must say something about The Problem of Action. So while solving this problem is not sufficient for our aims, doing so might seem to be necessary. Also a focus for philosophy of action.

Standard Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to an intention.

Alternative Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to a motor representation.

Observation: the Alternative Solution is not obviously in any way worse than the Standard Solution.
This brings me to a second objection ...

Objection 2

motor processes

Invoking motor representations yields a solution to the problem of action that is no worse than the Standard Solution.

Objection 1

habitual processes

Some actions run counter to any of the agent’s intentions because they are dominated by habitual processes.
 

✗ not consistent with the claim that all actions are appropriately related to intentions.

✓ consistent with the claim that all actions are appropriately related to motor representations.

Objection 2

motor processes

Invoking motor representations yields a solution to the problem of action that is no worse than the Standard Solution.

✓ consistent with the claim that all actions are appropriately related to intentions.

Difference matters because it entails that the objections are complementary in the sense that different strategies are probably needed to reply to them.

discoveries matter for philosophy of action

But now let’s think about responses to this objection
Actually it is better in one respect ...

What distinguishes your actions from things that merely happen to you? (‘The Problem of Action’)

Standard Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to an intention.

Alternative Solution: actions are those events which stand in an appropriate causal relation to a motor representation.

Objection 3

???

Is there an objection to the alterantive solution?

response 1

the Standad Solution is not the correct solution

This would require further argument and development, I think. Certainly it does not require asserting that the Motor Solution is correct!
There is something about agency that is missing from the Motor Solution.

‘Modern philosophy [...] enabled philosophers to equate action in general, human action, voluntary action, intentional action, and action done for reasons.’ (Hyman, 2015)

response 2

identify considerations favouring the Standard Solution

actions are done for reasons

Obstacle here is that this is true of all instrumental actions. The notion of being done for a reason would need much further specification in order to make it robustly require intentions if intentions are states that cause actions.
Will probably need to invoke the notion of a reason that an agent has, or the restriction that the reasons are considerations that the agent recognises as favouring the action.
Now the problem is that many things that appear to be actions do not seem to involve any such things.
In developing a response along these lines, it is important not to change the question by switching The Problem of Action for an alternative. (It’s almost trivial that there is some question to which the Standard Solution is the correct answer; our concern, of course, is with whether it is the correct answer to The Problem of Action.)
OK, I’ll leave you with the objection ...

essay questions related to todays lecture

How, if at all, should a philosophical theory of action incorporate scientific discoveries about the control of action?

Could some motor representations be intentions?

Which psychological structures enable agents to coordinate their plans? What if anything do these mechanisms reveal about how acting together differs from acting in parallel but merely individually?

How, if at all, should a philosophical theory of acting together incorporate scientific discoveries about the interpersonal coordination of action?

DO you know how to answer q?
problem of action problem of joint action we do need shared intention Bratman's planning theory Pacherie's team reason- ing theory collective goals we don't need shared intention dyadic motor plans we do need intention motor representa- tion habitual processes we don't need intention } }
Will need to do this, but first ...

plan

1. What is the relation between a very small scale instrumental action and the outcome or outcomes to which it is directed? ✓

2. How, if at all, does answering this question challenge the Standard Answer to the Problem of Action? ✓

3. Is there a parallel set of issues concerning joint action? ✓

Here is a taster, a reason to think that we might be on to something ...
A \emph{very small scale action} is one that is typically distantly related as a descendent by the means-end relation to the actions which are sometimes described as ‘small scale’ actions, such as playing a sonata, cooking a meal or painting a house (Bratman, 2014, p. 8).
There are very small scale joint actions like playing a chord together in the course of playing a duet, clinking glasses in the course of toasting our success, or plassing a plate between us in the course of doing the washing up together.

Small Scale
Shared Agency

Very Small Scale
Shared Agency

Playing a piano duet

Playing a chord together

Toasting our success together

Clinking glasses

Washing up together

Passing a plate between us

Philosophers have rarely considered such very small scale joint actions. But at least some such cases seem to involve exercising shared agency no less than larger scale activities like painting a house together.
But very small scale joint actions create a challenge to views like Gilbert’s.
Those views hinge on the roles of intention and practical reasoning.
But in at least some cases, very small scale joint actions are not a consequence of practical reasoning concerning those particular actions, nor need they involve intentions which specify outcomes to which the very small scale joint actions are directed. There is simply no need for practical reasoning, or intention, in many such cases. This is particularly obvious if you think about very small scale joint actions which occur in the context of larger scale activities, such as our playing a chord in the course of playing a piano duet.
Of course, there is no principled bar to having intentions concerning the goals of such very small scale actions (as far as I know), and such intentions may sometimes exist. But in very small scale cases of acting together, intentions and practical reasoning are often superfluous and sometimes absent.
Despite this, these very small scale interactions appear to involve exercises of shared agency no less than small scale activities such as playing a piano duet.
For very small scale cases, in virtue of what might they have collective goals?

plan

1. What is the relation between a very small scale instrumental action and the outcome or outcomes to which it is directed? ✓

2. How, if at all, does answering this question challenge the Standard Answer to the Problem of Action? ✓

3. Is there a parallel set of issues concerning joint action? ✓

problem of action problem of joint action we do need shared intention Bratman's planning theory Pacherie's team reason- ing theory collective goals we don't need shared intention dyadic motor plans we do need intention motor representa- tion habitual processes we don't need intention } }