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It seems reasonable to expect that any framework that supports theorising about action in the behavioural and social sciences must say something about The Problem of Action. So while solving this problem is not sufficient for our aims, doing so might seem to be necessary. Also a focus for philosophy of action.

 

Observation: the Alternative Solution is not obviously in any way worse than the Standard Solution.

 

This brings me to a second objection ...

 

Difference matters because it entails that the objections are complementary in the sense that different strategies are probably needed to reply to them.

 

But now let’s think about responses to this objection

 

Actually it is better in one respect ...

 

Is there an objection to the alterantive solution?

 

This would require further argument and development, I think. Certainly it does not require asserting that the Motor Solution is correct!

 

There is something about agency that is missing from the Motor Solution.

 

Obstacle here is that this is true of all instrumental actions. The notion of being done for a reason would need much further specification in order to make it robustly require intentions if intentions are states that cause actions.

 

Will probably need to invoke the notion of a reason that an agent has, or the restriction that the reasons are considerations that the agent recognises as favouring the action.

 

Now the problem is that many things that appear to be actions do not seem to involve any such things.

 

In developing a response along these lines, it is important not to change the question by switching The Problem of Action for an alternative. (It’s almost trivial that there is some question to which the Standard Solution is the correct answer; our concern, of course, is with whether it is the correct answer to The Problem of Action.)

 

OK, I’ll leave you with the objection ...

 

DO you know how to answer q?

 

Will need to do this, but first ...

 

Here is a taster, a reason to think that we might be on to something ...

 

 

There are very small scale joint actions like playing a chord together in the course of playing a duet, clinking glasses in the course of toasting our success, or plassing a plate between us in the course of doing the washing up together.

 

Philosophers have rarely considered such very small scale joint actions. But at least some such cases seem to involve exercising shared agency no less than larger scale activities like painting a house together.

 

But very small scale joint actions create a challenge to views like Gilbert’s.

 

Those views hinge on the roles of intention and practical reasoning.

 

But in at least some cases, very small scale joint actions are not a consequence of practical reasoning concerning those particular actions, nor need they involve intentions which specify outcomes to which the very small scale joint actions are directed. There is simply no need for practical reasoning, or intention, in many such cases. This is particularly obvious if you think about very small scale joint actions which occur in the context of larger scale activities, such as our playing a chord in the course of playing a piano duet.

 

Of course, there is no principled bar to having intentions concerning the goals of such very small scale actions (as far as I know), and such intentions may sometimes exist. But in very small scale cases of acting together, intentions and practical reasoning are often superfluous and sometimes absent.

 

Despite this, these very small scale interactions appear to involve exercises of shared agency no less than small scale activities such as playing a piano duet.

 

For very small scale cases, in virtue of what might they have collective goals?