The Question

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The Question

Let me inform (or remind) you how philosophers standardly think about action ...

‘What events in the life of a person reveal agency; what are his [sic] deeds and his doings in contrast to mere happenings in his history; what is the mark that distinguishes his actions?’

(Davidson, 1971, p. 43)

Brilliant theory, so simple. But what’s missing here? We are focussed entirely on an individual acting alone. There’s a parallel question about joint action ...

[joint action] What distinguishes doing something jointly with another person from acting in parallel with them but merely side by side?

To illustrate, consider ...

[moved earlier]

What did you do today? It is likely that some of your answers to this question refer to things you did individually and others to things you did jointly with others. In commonsense thinking about action and intention, the notion that many of the things that matter most in our lives are things we do with others seems unproblematic.

But theoretically things are rather different. In developmental, cognitive and philosophical research there is a long tradition of focusing exclusively on actions with just one agent.

There is no theoretical justification for the focus on just one individual acting alone---it simply makes things easier. But to restrict attention to actions with just one agent is to exclude many of the things that matter most.

We humans are, after all, one of those species that nurture babies cooperatively. It’s not just that we care to do things with others: capacities for joint action are critical for our species’ survival.

We need, therefore, to shift focus from one individual acting along to cases in which two or more individuals act together. That is, we need to shift from individual to joint action---such as moving a log together, sharing a smile, or ...

... cycling to school together.

The examples are deceptively simple. Philosophically, shifting from individual to joint action turns out to be surprisingly tricky.

Our aim in this section of the course is to understand some of the puzzles we face in trying to understand, at a very basic level, what is involved in joint action. And maybe we will even solve some of them.

Let’s start by trying to get a pre-theoretical handle on the notion of joint action. I’ve already given you some examples, but it’s even better to use contrast cases ...

The problem of joint action is to work out what distinguishes things that go on this side from things that go on this side. So let me give you another example. You're in the central cafe, and members of a flash mob simultaneously and noisily crack open their newspapers. This is a signal for the start of their performance. And you're lucky you think, oh, that's fantastic. What a great time to be in Budapest. And then just by chance, it turns out that one person who happened simultaneously to crack open her newspaper at just that moment is looking around full of confusion, this unexpected effect of the action. So here's the onlooker who simultaneously opened their newspaper at the same time. She's clearly acting in parallel with the members of the flash mob, but she's not part of their activity. She's not part of the joint action. So again, we want to know what distinguishes things that are genuine joint actions, simultaneously opening your newspapers to signal the start of your performance with something that's an action performed in parallel with yours, but nevertheless is merely an individual action.

Give another contrast pair.

You have 90 seconds to think of another pair of examples which contrast joint action with parallel but merely individual action.

These and other contrasting pairs invite the question, What distinguishes joint action from parallel but merely individual action?

A natural first thought is that in joint action, our actions are coordinated. But this turns out not to be a distinguishing feature of joint action because ...

... when two strangers cycle side by side, their actions may need to be highly coordinated so that they do not crash even if they are merely acting in parallel.

Another idea is that in joint action, our actions have a common effect. So, for example, when the flash mob open their newspapers, there is a strikingly loud rustle of paper. None of them individually cause this loud rustle: instead it is a common effect of their actions.

But consider the actions of the flash mob together with those of the onlookers. All of these actions have a common effect---the strikingly loud rustle of paper is produced by the simultaneity of their actions. And this applies to the onlookers who merely happen to open their newspapers just as the flash mob starts no less than to the members of the flash mob.

So what does distinguish joint action from actions which occur in parallel but are merely individual? Not coordination, not common effects. So what is it?

[This is just to say that the question, What distinguishes joint action from parallel but merely individual action? is not straightforward to answer. ]

Question

What distinguishes joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions?

Requirement

Any account of shared agency must draw a line between joint actions and parallel but merely individual actions.

Aim

Theoretical framework for psychology and formal models.

This seems like a boring question, especially in relation to some of the aims of the leading philosophers in this area ...

‘discover the nature of social groups in general’ (Gilbert, 1990, p. 2)

The hope is that investigating a notion such as shared intentionality will enable us, eventually, to ‘discover the nature of social groups in general’ (Gilbert, 1990, p. 2) and to understand the conceptual, metaphysical and normative aspects of basic forms of sociality (Bratman, 2014, p. 3). .slide

understand the conceptual, metaphysical and normative aspects of basic forms of sociality (Bratman, 2014, p. 3).

But one route to these lofty goals is to focus on distinguishing genuinely joint from merely parallel activities in mundane cases involving two or three people.

Boring is good as long as it eventually lets us answer the big questions.

Question

What distinguishes joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions?

Requirement

Any account of shared agency must draw a line between joint actions and parallel but merely individual actions.

Aim

Theoretical framework for psychology and formal models.

This is the organising question for our project (the project to be investigated in this part of the lectures). Of course there will be lots of further questions, but I like to have something simple to frame our thinking and this question serves that purpose.

My hope is that by answering this seemingly straightforward question, we will be in a position to answer the hard question about which forms of shared agency underpin our social nature.

The first two contrast cases are supposed to show that this question isn’t easy to answer because the most obvious, simplest things you might appeal to---coordination and common effects---won’t enable you to draw the distinction.

This invites us to think in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Of course, there are all kinds of reasons why this might be problematic, and we will consider many such reasons. But as I just said, having simple ideas to frame our thinking is good, and that’s why I take this as my working aim. (The ultimate aim is a ‘Blueprint for a Social Animal’, but it is difficult to be precise about what that will involve at this stage.)

short essay question:

Why, if at all, do we need a theory of shared intention?

(Will be a while before this question makes sense.)

plan d’attaque

premise: Shared intention can only be understood as the solution to a problem.

1. What is the Problem of Joint Action? ✓

2. Can we solve the Problem without shared intention? ✓

3. If we do need shared intention, what is the best account available? ✓

This is difficult to explain ... the motive for attempting to characterise joint action without shared intention is that it has proved extremely tricky to say what it is, and there are umpteen conflicting accounts of the matter.

What we need here is to understand which rabbit hole we are not going down, and that in advance of actually going down the rabbit hole.

Recall our question, What distinguishes joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions?

shared intention

‘A first step is to say that what distinguishes you and me from you and the Stranger is that you and I share an intention to walk together—we (you and I) intend to walk together—but you and the Stranger do not. In modest sociality, joint activity is explained by such a shared intention; whereas no such explanation is available for the combined activity of you and the Stranger. This does not, however, get us very far; for we do not yet know what a shared intention is, and how it connects up with joint action’ (Bratman, 2009, p. 152).

‘A first step is to say that what distinguishes’ the sisters cycling together from the strangers cycling side by side is that the sisters share an intention to cycle together ... but the strangers do not.

‘This does not, however, get us very far; for we do not yet know what a shared intention is’

Bratman, 2009 p. 152

Lots of philosophers and some psychologists think that all joint actions involve shared intention, and even that characterising joint action is fundamentally a matter of characterising shared intention.

‘I take a collective action to involve a collective [shared] intention.’

(Gilbert, 2006, p. 5)

(Gilbert 2006, p. 5)

‘The sine qua non of collaborative action is a joint goal [shared intention] and a joint commitment’

(Tomasello, 2008, p. 181)

(Tomasello 2008, p. 181)

‘the key property of joint action lies in its internal component [...] in the participants’ having a “collective” or “shared” intention.’

(Alonso, 2009, pp. 444--5)

(Alonso 2009, pp. 444-5)

‘Shared intentionality is the foundation upon which joint action is built.’

(Carpenter, 2009, p. 381)

(Carpenter 2009, p. 381)

shared intention

‘shared’ 1 : Ayesha and her best friend have the same haircut

-> the Simple Theory (not what they have in mind)

‘shared’ 2 : Ayesha and her brother share a mother

-> plural subject account (Schmid, Helm)

Let’s try to understand, in really minimal terms, what the plural subject account is saying ...

For comparison, properties like mass and volume can have plural subjects.

e.g. our volume, yours and mine, is approx 130 litres.

The 130 litres (65 litres per person) is actually based on a scientific source.

cf. our intention, yours and mine, is that we paint the house.

On a view like Bratman’s, shared intentions are not shared. They are also not intentions.

‘shared’ 3: The group shares a wheelbarrow

-> aggregate (or ‘group’) agent (Pettit, Gold & Sugden)

Be careful not to confuse plural and group agents.

I was asking what it is. So far only negative characterisation: neither shared nor an intention.

shared intention

- not shared; not intention

ok give up it really is a problem.

We need to postulate shared intention

‘This does not, however, get us very far; for we do not yet know what a shared intention is’

Bratman, 2009 p. 152

short essay question:

Why, if at all, do we need a theory of shared intention?

(Will be a while before this question makes sense.)

plan d’attaque

premise: Shared intention can only be understood as the solution to a problem.

1. What is the Problem of Joint Action? ✓

2. Can we solve the Problem without shared intention? ✓

3. If we do need shared intention, what is the best account available? ✓

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The Question

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