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Quick Answers Fail

1

quick answer

Is this argument correct? Is there an objection to it?

2

quick answer

Problem: what does it mean to say that someone is the agent of an event? This is a made up idea, so we answer the question with a stipulation ...
With this revision—a joint action is an event with two or more agents—we've successfully included lots and lots of these examples that are supposedly paradigm cases of joint action. But we also have run up against a problem ...
Here we have Fred, and Fred has annoyed two people who happen to be rather skilled assassins.
This was unwise.
And what happens is that Nora goes off. She realises this is the perfect moment to to kill Fred. So she goes off and hides in a telephone box with her sniper rifle and fires a shot and, unbeknown to Nora, simultaneously but completely separately, Olive has hit upon the same conclusion this is the perfect time to kill Fred, so she's on the roof of the building with her sniper rifle, and they both fire shots.
And as it turns out, neither shot is fatal. But unfortunately, together they both are.
They do call an ambulance, but it doesn't quite work out and Fred sadly dies.
Well, not sadly for Olive and Nora, but for everybody else.
So what you've got here is a case where, by construction, Nora and Olive are acting in parallel, but merely individually.
They're not performing a joint action, by the way that I've constructed that case.
But yet, of course, they are the agents of the event which comprises their shooting and Fred's death.
So now it looks like this idea is much too broad.
And indeed, once you've seen this structure, you can see that if we say a joint action is an event with two or more agents, then there'll be all kinds of cases where we have what you might think of as spurious joint actions. So there you are on the motorway, sitting in your car, and there's another person sitting in the car next to you, and you and all of these people who are in that traffic jam are, of course, polluting the environment.
You're pumping out all of these dangerous chemicals into the environment that cause people to die early. And that will count on this thing as a joint action. So there's an event, you're polluting the environment. You're all the agents of that event.
Is this argument correct? Is there an objection to it?

3

quick answer

our question, What distinguishes joint action from parallel but merely individual action?
we saw, it isn’t just that joint actions are coordinated, nor just that they have common effects.
we need to think in not in terms of the actions but in terms of the intentions behind them?

We each intend that we, you and I, cycle to school together.

The third quick answer makes a bit of a concession.
We are going to talk about intention, but we're not going to appeal to any special shared intention or anything else.
We're just going to have an intention an ordinary intention, and it's going to be shared in the same sense that Aisha and her best friend share a haircut.
What we're going to say is that when people are performing a joint action, but not when they're acting in parallel, but merely individually, they will each have this intention that they, the two sisters or whoever it is, cycled to school together.
Similarly, if our. Washing up together is a joint action rather than something that we're doing in parallel, but merely individually. Then we will have an intention that we, you and I, wash the dishes together.

What distinguishes ...
... an ordinary, individual action from a mere happening?

We can understand this idea by comparison with a claim about ordinary, individual action. What distinguishes genuine joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions? For example, suppose the coffee in cup in your hand ends up all over my face. This event might involve an action on your part, or it might be a mere happening. What distinguishes the two?

— Your intention that you throw the coffee at me.

One quite standard idea is that it is intention. Where the event is an action, you must have an intention to throw coffee in my face and this intention must be appropriately related to your action. By contrast, where there is no such intention the event is merely an accident.


... genuine joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions?

— Our intentions that we, you and I, cycle to school together.

The Simple Theory

Two or more agents perform an intentional joint action
exactly when there is an act-type, φ, such that
each agent intends that
they, these agents, φ together
and their intentions are appropriately related to their actions.

Explain: ‘I wish I had done that’.
[have both formal version and transcript version]
[transcript version (undergrad course)]
One thing to note here is that we're not, strictly speaking, talking about joint action. So really with the question was about joint action. But what we switched to is talking about intentional joint action. Now for many people, that doesn't really matter because they think that all the actions there are are intentional actions. That's certainly Davidson's view, for example. But there are other philosophers who think that there are actions which are instrumental but not intentional. And in that case, this won't give us a super general idea. But I feel like that's that's not like our biggest problem right now.
[formal version (postgrad course)]
We are no longer talking about joint action generally, only about intentional joint action. Compare individual action: much individual action is arguably purposive but not intentional. Similarly, we might think that there are non-intentional but purposive joint actions.
A further problem concerns the link between intentional joint action and intention. Consider individual action. Bratman has good arguments for holding that actions can be intentional under a description even when no intention specifies that description; and he also holds that agents incapable of intending may nevertheless perform intentional actions. So it is conceivable that not all intentional joint action will involve intention. In that case, the Simple Theory may not even be a fully general account of intentional joint action.
I’m not going to pursue these issues yet, but we will come back to them. For now I just want to note that, for all its simplicity, the Simple Theory raises some tricky questions.
For now I am treating the Simple Theory as offering necessary and sufficient conditions for intentional joint action, because I want to start with an ambitious claim. But reflecion on the relation between intention and intentional action may force us to back down later.
Explain: deviant causal chains.
The last thing is you've got this strange thing at the end with the intentions have to be appropriately related to the action. And that's, of course, because of the problem of deviant causal chains that we came across before. So that, of course is going to arise in the joint case as well. And so we're just kind of ruling that out by stipulation and not saying how you would actually deal with that.
Next step will be to consider an objection.
Can you think of an objection to the Simple Theory?

another contrast case: blocking the aisle

Imagine two sisters who, getting off an aeroplane, tacitly agree to exact revenge on the unruly mob of drunken hens behind them by standing so as to block the aisle together. This is a joint action. Meanwhile on another flight, two strangers happen to be so configured that they are collectively blocking the aisle. The first passenger correctly anticipates that the other passenger, who is a complete stranger, will not be moving from her current position for some time. This creates an opportunity for the first passenger: she intends that they, she and the stranger, block the aisle. And, as it happens, the second passenger’s thoughts mirror the first’s.
[transcript from ug version]
I'm trying to construct two cases, one in which there's genuine joint action and two people are blocking the aisle, and one in which there's clearly parallel but merely individual action and two people are blocking the aisle.
So contrast cases are similar as possible, except for the one is clearly joint action and one is clearly not.
So here's the joint action case. You and I are on a plane together and there's a party. There's like a stag party. And they've been really, really noisy and kept us awake overnight on this flight. And we kind of, you know, we're not best pleased about this. And then it turns out that they're really antsy because our plane is a little bit delayed and they've got a tight connection. Now, you and I are not normally this evil, but we have been sleep deprived on a transatlantic flight by some particularly obnoxious stag party. And so our normal good nature has failed us. And so Naran says to me, Steve, why don't we just stand in the aisle for a good long while and I'm going to spend some time pulling out this heavy case or faking it, and you're going to be down there sort of trying to lift up the bag, and we'll block the aisle and we'll just, you know, we won't make them miss their flight, but we're going to make them, like, really a bit nervous about this whole thing. And, you know, I'm like, Naren, that's a great idea. You know, we're going to get our revenge on them. And so we do that.
We're performing a joint action. And the joint action is blocking the aisle with the aim of preventing the stag party from exiting the plane in a timely fashion, and so repaying them for the night of sleep that we lost.
This is clearly a paradigm example of joint action. I'm not proud of what we did now, but it's a paradigm example of joint action.
There's another occasion in my parallel world where it's not going to be a joint action parallel, but merely individual. So there are two people, say it's Chris and Mina. They don't know each other. They're complete strangers to each other. And what happens is that Mina observes Chris attempting or apparently attempting to pull down his heavy suitcase, and Mina thinks to herself, Chris is going to be there for a good long time. I will block the stag party behind me by bending down and pretending to lift up this heavy case, using Chris merely as a kind of like space filling device.
So I think he's going to be there for a while so I can block their exit by holding on and pretending this case. What Mina does not realise is that Chris has observed her bag, and he thought, mistakenly, that Mina's bag was really properly wedged in there, and he, with the intention that he and Mina would lock the aisle, has decided to spend a long time pretending to get his heavy bag down. So Chris intended that he, he and Mina blocked the aisle together, thinking from Chris's point of view that Mina was simply going to be there for a while. And so from his point of view, she simply space occupying. Mina intends that she, Chris and Mina block the aisle together, but from her point of view, Chris just happens to be someone who is bit incompetent and can't get his bag down. So they both meet the conditions of the simple theory, but they have no awareness of each other. Mina.
They have no awareness of each other. And so it looks like they're acting in parallel, but merely individually. And indeed, if you ask them, if you said, Chris, you know, are you doing this with Mina? Chris would say, well, kind of, because I'm relying on her, but it's not. I'm not really doing it with her. I don't know her at all. We've never spoken about this. I think she just can't get her bag out. And, Mina, you would say the same about Chris.
There is a contrast. One of these cases is joint action. One of them is parallel but merely individual. And yet the conditions of the simple theory are met in both cases. And therefore this is a counterexample to the claim that the simple theory allows us to solve the problem of joint action, to say what distinguishes joint actions from parallel, but merely individual actions.

1. The sisters perform an intentional joint action; the strangers’ actions are parallel but merely individual.

2. In both cases, the conditions of the Simple Theory are met.

The feature under consideration as distinctive of joint action is present: each passenger is acting on her intention that they, the two passengers, block the aisle.

therefore:

3. The Simple Theory does not correctly answer the question, What distinguishes joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions?

Is it really a counterexample?
Recall our earlier contrast cases ...

Question

What distinguishes joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions?

The Simple Theory

I’ve been arguing that the Simple Theory is either outright wrong or else radically incomplete as an account of shared agency.
Apparently, it is possible for two or more agents to each intend that they do one thing together and to act on these intentions without them thereby exercising shared agency a strong-ish sense.
So the Simple Theory fails to provide a satisfying answer to the question, What distinguishes genuine joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions?
Let me pause to say why this matters and how it fits into the big picture ...
Philosophers have offered a tremendous variety of incompatible, wildly complicated and conceptually innovative theories about shared agency. The Simple Theory is an obstacle to discussing these theories. If the Simple Theory is correct, none of the complexity philosophers have offered is needed.
The first problem I encounter in thinking about shared agency is that philosophers seem to take for granted without argument that the Simple Theory can be excluded. In fact it is surprisingly difficult to show that the Simple Theory is wrong. The usual argument against it is that it is circular, but we saw that this argument depends on the mistaken assumption that all cases of acting together involve joint action.
A better objection to the Simple Theory involves counterexamples. But we saw that the standard counterexample, Bratman’s mafia cases, does not work. However refining that counterexample does appear to present a problem for the Simple Theory.
Note that I don’t claim that the objection to the Simple Theory is decisive; in fact one of my aims (but not in these lectures) is to show that it is possible to save the Simple Theory. Nevertheless I do think that the objections to it are serious enough that we must now explore what proper philosophers have to say about shared agency.

Joint actions are actions with two or more agents ✘

Joint actions are events with two or more agents ✘

quick responses failed

The so-called Problem of Joint Action really is a problem.

short essay question:

Why, if at all, do we need a theory of shared intention?

(Will be a while before this question makes sense.)

plan d’attaque

premise: Shared intention can only be understood as the solution to a problem.

1. What is the Problem of Joint Action?

2. Can we solve the Problem without shared intention?

3. If we do need shared intention, what is the best account available?

So this is how to answer the essay question.
Think about it for a moment. I’m going to go on and sketch a theory of what shared intention is. But you do not need any such thing in this essay. The question is whether we need a theory of shared intention, not what that theory looks like.
Do you have an idea about how to answer the question?

short essay question:

Why, if at all, do we need a theory of shared intention?

possible argument

1. The Problem of Joint Action is a genuine problem.

2. We need a theory of shared intention only if the Problem cannot be solved without one.

EITHER
3. I will argue that Position X solves the problem without shared intention.
OR
3.′ Although Position X, which does not involve shared intention, appears to be good solution to the problem, I will object that it does not succeed.

It’s not too hard to give an ok answer to this question, demonstrating knowledge and understanding
It’s hard to give a really good answer to this question, which would require going beyond the lecture notes. One of the problems is that nearly all the literature just assumes that shared intention is necessary.
On the other hand, this is a question that allows you to stay in the philosophy part of the course.
[SKIP SLIDES FROM THE NEXT UNIT!!!!]
[saves 45 slides]