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Goal-Directed and Habitual: Some Evidence

‘instrumental behavior itself involves two systems, the goal-directed and the habitual’

(Dickinson & Pérez, 2018, p. 12)

prediction?

We are intervening on the cognitive load (stress), so we would expect ...
Lower influence from goal-directed processes that without the intevention
But how does this lead to the prediction that preferences will matter less?

habitual process

Action occurs in the presence of Stimulus.

Outcome follows action

Agent is thereby rewarded

Stimulus-Action Link is strengthened due to reward

Given Stimulus, will Action occur? It depends on the strength of the Stimulus-Action Link.

‘goal-directed’ process

Action leads to Outcome.
 

Belief in Action-Outcome link is strengthened.

Agent has a Desire for the Outcome
 

Will Action occur? It depends on the Belief in the Action-Outcome Link and Agent’s Desire.

what we are seeing is that the influence of preferences wanes, indicating that habitual processes

‘instrumental behavior itself involves two systems, the goal-directed and the habitual’

(Dickinson & Pérez, 2018, p. 12)

prediction?

prediction: increasing stress will reduce the influence of your preferences

Evidence: Schwabe & Wolf, 2010

Schwabe and Wolf, 2010 figure 1

‘Figure 1. (A) Time line of the experiment. Participants were first trained in the instrumental task. After the selective outcome devaluation (satiation with oranges or chocolate pudding) but before the extinction test, subjects were exposed to stress (socially evaluated cold pressor test) or a control condition. (B) The instrumental task (reproduced with permission from the Society for Neuroscience). Participants completed three trial types (chocolate, orange, and neutral). In each trial type, there was one action that led with a high probability to a food outcome and one action that led with a low probability to a food outcome. Depending on the trial type, the high probability action yielded chocolate milk or orange juice with a probability of p = 0.5, a common outcome (peppermint tea) with a probability of p = 0.2, or nothing. The low probability action led to the common liquid with a probability of p = 0.2. After an action was chosen, the referring symbol was highlighted for 3 s before the food was delivered. During the extinction test, chocolate milk and orange juice were no longer presented.’

Schwabe and Wolf, 2010 figure 6

‘Figure 6. Percent high probability actions of controls and stressed participants in the last 15-trial block of training and the first 15-trial block of extinction testing. After selective outcome devaluation, controls showed a decrease in the choice of the high probability action associated with the food eaten to satiety (* p < .01) whereas the choice behavior of stressed participants was insensitive to the changes in outcome value. Data represent M ± SEM.’

When stressed,

your preferences matter less:

habits dominate.

How is this evidence for the dual-process theory of instrumental action?

We are intervening on the cognitive load (stress), so we would expect ...
Lower influence from goal-directed processes that without the intevention
But how does this lead to the prediction that preferences will matter less?
[SKIP THIS SECTION UNLESS SOMEONE ASKS]

How exactly do we derive that prediction?

I.e. the prediction that cognitive load will selectively hinder the goal-directed process.

Having two processes
allows you to make complementary
speed–accuracy trade-offs:
habitual processes are fast but limited, whereas goal-directed processes are more flexible but slower

Any broadly computational system will face ...
We are intervening on the cognitive load (stress), so we would expect ...
Lower influence from goal-directed processes that without the intevention
But how does this lead to the prediction that preferences will matter less?

more evidence

neurophysiology

‘[instumental] and habitual control have been doubly dissociated in two brain regions.

In the PFC, lesions of the prelimbic and infralimbic areas disrupt goal-directed and habitual behavior, respectively ...

prelimbic cortex is part of dmPFC (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex)
infralimbic cortex is part of vmPFC (ventromedial prefrontal cortex)

These dissociations suggest that different neural circuits mediate the two forms of control’

(Dickinson, 2016, p. 184)

conclusion - three bits of evidence

  • cognitive load (via stress) - Schwabe & Wolf (2010)
  • [representation of contingency - Klossek, Yu, & Dickinson (2011)]
  • neurophysiology - Dickinson (2016)
    • skipped the evidence about representation of contingency this year.