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reductive vs aggregate
What is shared intention?
Functional characterisation:
shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities, (b) coordinate planning and (c) structure bargaining
Constraint:
Inferential integration... and normative integration (e.g. agglomeration)
Substantial account:
We have a shared intention that we J if
‘1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J
‘2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of la, lb, and meshing subplans of la and lb; you intend [likewise] …
‘3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us’
(Bratman 1993: View 4)
all intentions have individual subjects
reductive vs aggregate
On accounts like Bratman’s or Gilbert’s, ‘it makes some sense to say that the result is a kind of shared action: the individual people are, after all, acting intentionally throughout.
However, in a deeper sense, the activity is not shared: the group itself is not engaged in action whose aim the group finds worthwhile, and so the actions at issue here are merely those of individuals.
Thus, these accounts ... fail to make sense of a ... part of the landscape of social phenomena’
Helm (2008, pp. 20-1)
How?
aggregate subject
‘[...] a distinctive mode of practical reasoning, team reasoning, in which agency is attributed to groups.’
Gold and Sugden (2006)
‘somebody team reasons if she works out the best possible feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in it.’
Bacharach (2006, p. 121)
‘[A] team exists to the extent that its members take themselves to be members of it.
[T]o take oneself to be a member of a team is to engage in such reasoning oneself, while holding certain beliefs about the use of such reasoning by others’
Sugden (2000)
‘somebody team reasons if she works out the best possible feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in it.’
Bacharach (2006, p. 121)
best = maximises expected utility, but ...
game theory | team reasoning | |
what is appraised? | my actions | sets of our actions |
what is the standard of appraisal? | my preferences | team-directed preferences |
‘At the level of the team, team preference is a ranking of outcomes which is revealed in the team's decisions.’
(Sugden, 2000)
Why suppose that team reasoning explains how
there could be aggregate subjects?
Katzen et al. (2023)
Why suppose that team reasoning explains how
there could be aggregate subjects?
game theory is already agnostic about agents ...
individual adult humans (suspects under arrest)
bower birds (maraud/guard nests)
business organisations (product pricing)
countries (international environmental policy)
(Dixit, Skeath, & Reiley, 2014, p. chapter 10)
... so aggregates with preferences that maximise their expected utility are already in view.
How?
aggregate subject
1. What is team reasoning? ✓
2. [background] aggregate subjects ✓
3. How might team reasoning be used in constructing a theory of shared intention? ✓